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GENEVA OTERO and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services,
Case No. 16819

Plaintiffs-Respondents,;
vs.
JOE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLAHT

I

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action sought a determination of paternity,
(

a judgment for past welfare support paid for the minor
child of the parties by the State of Utah, and an order
for on-going and future support for the child pursuant
to the provisions of U.C.A., §78-45a-l (1953), as amended.
The Defendant voluntarily acknowledged paternity of the
child in question.

Based thereon, the Plaintiffs moved
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the lower Court for a Sunnnary Judgment as to the issue of
back support.

A judgment was granted in favor of

Plaintiff for the welfare support previously paid by
the State of Utah.
Defendant has appealed from that money judgment.
II
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was
heard on November 14, 1979.

After oral arguments,

the Court below granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, and awarded Plaintiffs a judgment in the amount
of Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-nine and 67/100
Dollars ($4,179.67) for past welfare support paid.

Said

judgment was timely appealed by Defendant-Appellant herein.
III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment
below and a determination that as a matter of law an
indigent father is not liable for welfare payments made
for the support of his child by the State of Utah.
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IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This paternity action was filed in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County initially
seeking a determination of paternity, a judgment for
amounts paid by the State of Utah for support of the child,
born March 30, 1978, and a continuing order for future
support pursuant to U.C.A., §78-45a-l et. seq. (1953).
The Defendant acknowledged paternity of the
child in question by Stipulation.

Plaintiffs filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment based on Defendant's
acknowledgment.

Defendant opposed Plaintiffs' Motion

establishing that he had been indigent at the time
of the child's birth and at all times since, and contending
that he should therefore not be held liable for the support
payment made by the State of Utah.
Upon oral Stipulation of the parties in open
court, the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint
as to we.lfare amounts paid were admitted.

The lower Court

heard Plaintiffs' Motion for Surrnnary Judgment on November
14, 1979.

In an Order dated December 3, 1979, the

Court below granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Sunmiary Judgment
and entered a money judgment for past support.
The Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal
from the Summary Judgment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 30, 1978, the co-Plaintiff, Geneva
Otero, gave birth out of wedlock to a female child, Elisha
Miera (R.30).

At the time of co-Plaintiff Otero's pregnancy

and confinement, she was receiving public assistance from
the State of Utah.

She continued to receive

public

assistance payments from the State of Utah for the child
from April, 1978 through September, 1979.

In all, Plaintiff

Ctero incurred Nine Hundred Eighteen Dollars and 67 /100
($918. 67) in benefits for medical expenses related to
the birth of the child and Three Thousand Two Hundred
Sixty-one Dollars ($3,261.00) in monthly benefits for the
child's support from April, 1978 through September, 1979.
(R. 37)

The child in question was killed in an
automobile accident in September, 1979.

The matter of

on-going future support is therefore not in issue.
Prior to the child's birth, the Defendant was
arrested and incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail
(R. 22).

He was held continuously in the jail until

April 2, 1979 when he was transfered to the Utah State
Prison where he is still confined (R. 22).

During his
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incarceration in the jail from March 30, 1978 to
April 2, 1979, the Defendant had no income from any
source whatsoever (R. 22).

From the time of his transfer

to the Utah State Prison on April 2, 1979 until the present,
the Defendant's income has never exceeded Twenty Dollars

($20.00) per month (R. 23).

The Defendant's present

worldly assets are items of clothing and personal property
with him at the Utah State Prison having a value of less
than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) (R. 27).
The Defendant adknowledged paternity of the
child.

The Defendant argued below that, owing to his

extreme poverty during all the time the State of Utah
paid support for the child, he should not be obligated to
re-imburse the State of Utah for support payments made.
VI
ARGUMENT
Point I
WHERE THE STATE PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR
A CHILD OF INDIGENT PARENTS, THE FATHER
SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO RE-IMBURSE
THE STATE.
The applicable statute in the instant case is
U.C.A. §78-45-7 (1953) which provides as follows:
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'

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support.-(1) Prospective support shall be equal to
the amount granted by prior court order
unless there has been a material change
of circumstance on the part of the obliger
or obligee.

(2) When no prior court order exists, or a
material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court in determining the
amount of prospective support, shall
consider all relevant factors including
but not limited to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the standard of living and situation
of the parties;
the relative wealth and income
of the parties;
the ability of the obliger to earn;
the ability of the obligee to earn;
the need of the obligee;
the age of the parties;
the responsiblity of the obliger
for the support of others.

(3) When no prior court order exists, the
court shall determine and assess all arrearages
based upon, but not limited to:
(a)

the amount of public assistance
received by the obligee, if any;

(b)

the funds that have been reasonably
and necessarily expended in support
of spouse and children.

U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), provides two express
criteria to be used in determining support arrear ages.
are:

These

(1) the amount of public assistance received by the

obligee; and (2) the amount reasonably and necessarily
expended in support of spouse and children.

The statute does

not preclude the consideration of other factors.
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The lower court interpreted the statute as
dictating that the first criteria was the only criteria
which need be used in determining the amount of support
arrearages.

The lower court did not receive any evidence

as to the reasonableness of the funds expended, pursuant
to U.C.A. §78-45-7 (3) (b), and the lower court ignored
the prefatory clause of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953),
which provides:
Where no prior court order exists, the
court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon, but not limited
to: ... (emphasis added)

By the language "not limited to" in U.C.A., §78-45-7(3),
(1953), the legislature demonstrated its intent that other
criteria should be reviewed by the Court in its equitable
discretion.
An additional criteria which must be judicially

incorporated into U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), is
the financial capacity of the obliger/defendant to pay
support to the obligee, both during the time support is
provided by the State and at the time of judgment.

The

legislature expressed the policy that no one should be
legally obligated to pay an amount of support beyond his
or her financial means by specifically listing ability to
~

as a criteria for determining the amount of on-going
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support pursuant to U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953).

That

subsection requires that the poverty or wealth of the

obliger must be considered in determining support obligations,:
The statute requires the Court to consider the standard of

I

living of the parties, the relative wealth and income of
the partes, and the ability of the obliger to earn, in
fixing the amount of a prospective support obligation.
It is illogical to assume that the legislature required
these elements to be ignored when determining arrearages
for support where no prior order for support exists.

The

legislature provided that the criteria to be used in determini1tl
support arrearages are not limited to those expressly
stated in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), indicating that
other criteria such as those listed in the proceeding
subsection should be considered.
Ability to pay must be a criteria for assessing
support arrearages by virtue of prior court decision.

This

court has previously held that the principal consideration
in making determinations of child support are the needs
of the child and the ability of the parents to provide
support.

Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P2d 518 (Utah, 1978).

These Court enunciated considerations should be incorporated
into U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3) when determining an obliger's
liability for past support.
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The uncontroverted affidavits of the D~fendant
in this case prove that he lacked the ability to pay
support or to earn money during the time the State of
Utah supported the child and that he lacked the ability,
the resources, or the assets to pay the arrearages at
the time judgment was entered against him.

Pursuant to

U.C.A. §78-45-7 (1953), the financial capacity of an
obliger to pay support must be considered in determining
support arrearages, and the Defendant, because of his
extreme poverty, should not be required to re-imburse
the State of Utah for past support paid.
Point II
THE TIME WHEN AN ACTION FOR SUPPORT
ARREARAGES IS COMMENCED SHOULD NOT
BE DETERMINATIVE OF AN OBLIGOR'S
LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT, OF THE CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING LIABILITY, OR OF THE
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT.
The Plaintiffs argued and the Court below found
that the ability of an obliger to pay support is an
appropriate factor to consider only in determining the
amount of on-going support.

In effect, Plaintiffs and the

lower court have concluded that if there were a question
of Defendant's liability for on-going support, the issue
of his poverty would become relevant pursuant to U.C.A.,
§78-45-7 (2)' (1953).
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~he

present action for child support could

have been brought at any time after Plaintiff Otero
conceived.

If this action had been brought prior to

the child's birth, and if Defendant had acknowledged
paternity at or before birth, the court below would have
considered only Defendant's obligation for on-going
support, since no support arrearages would have accrued.
The lower court then would have determined Defendant's
liability based on the criteria set forth in U.C.A.,
§78-45-7 (2), (1953), including Defendant's wealth (or
lack thereof) and ability to earn.

Instead, this action

for support was brought only after substantial arrearages
had accrued.

The judgment was obtained months later

after still more arrearages had accrued.

When the support

at issue became arrearages rather than future support,
the lower court found that the criteria of Subsection (2)
(wealth, earning ability, etc.) were no longer to be
considered in determining Defendant's liability.

The lower

court determined Defendant's arrear ages based soley on the
express criteria of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), and found that
Defendant's poverty could not be considered in imposing
liability for support arrearages.
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The .time at which an action is brought should
not be determinative of the outcome of the action.

Not

one relevant factor changed during the course of the instant
case.

The Defendant remained incapable of providing

support, the minor rihild continued to be in need of
support, and the State of Utah continued to pay support
for the benefit of the child in need.

Yet, the Court

below has found that mere passage of time, the mere
changing of support from a future event to a past event,
has somehow made it improper to consider Defendant's
poverty in determining his liability for support.
If the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
based on Defendant's acknowledgment of paternity had come
on for hearing at the time of the child's birth, the
lower Court would have been required to consider the factors
outlined in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953).

It is

inequitable not to consider those elements in the instant
case simply because the issue has become one of arrearages.
The Court is not limited to consideration of
the criteria expressly mentioned in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3),
(1953), in determining Defendants liability.

The Court must

also consider the criteria of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953),
since these are the same criteria which would have been
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considered had the action been brought earlier.

In

light of the Defendant's extreme poverty, the Defendant
should not be liable to the State of Utah for past support
paid.
Point III
THE STATE SHOULD NOT IMPOSE A SUPPORT
OBLIGATION ON A·PARENT WHICH IS FAR
IN EXCESS OF THE PARENT'S ABILITY TO
PAY SUPPORT.
It is not the policy of the State of Utah to
impose child support obligations on a parent in excess of
the parent's ability to pay.

This is demonstrated by the

criteria listed in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), which
require that a parent's wealth or poverty, standard of
living, and ability td earn be considered in fixing support
obligations.

Moreover, the Utah State Legislature has

recognized that there are some circumstances under which
adults are incapable of supporting themselves and/or their
children.

The legislature has provided for these circumstance.,:

by creating a program for public assistance in Utah U. C.A.,
§55-15a-l, (1953) et. seq.

U.C.A. §55-15a-l, (1953) states

the purpose of the public assistance act as follows:
It is the purpose of this act to
provide assistance to any person
in Utah in n~ed. A person is in
need and entitled to assistance
if sufficient resources are not
available for his use within the
limitations set forth herein and
who otherwise qualifies.
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The existance of the public assistance program acknowledges
that some people need financial help.

This State will

assist its citizens when its citizens cannot assist themselves.
The Defendant in this case has proved his extremely
impoverished condition through two uncontroverted affidavits
submitted to the Court below.

It would be a violation of

the intent expressed in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), to
impose any obligation for support, either past or future,
on a man who literally is not and never has been able to
pay.

It would contradict the policy of public assistance

in this State to impose an obligation for past support on
the Defendant.

The situations and circumstances of all

the parties in this case are exactly the circumstances and
situations which the public assistance program was designed
to take care of.

The Defendant was not able to support the

child from the time of her birth until the time of her
death

'

and he is still not able to re-imburse the State

which supported the child.

Since the Plaintiff Otero

qualified for and received public assistance for herself
and the child, it can be presumed that she was also incapable
of supporting her child during the time in question.
child could not support herself.

The

Since no one with a duty

to support the child could do so, the State of Utah, in
keeping with its policy of aiding its indigent citizens,
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supported the child.

It would be incongruent if the State

of Utah were now permitted to go against the indigent
Defendant father for support monies paid.
It would be arbitrary and unreasonable to impose
a duty on the Defendant beyond his ability.

When the law

imposes an obligation on a person beyond that person's
ability to meet that obligation, when the law requires a
higher standard of performance than a person is capable
of giving, it.fosters disregard for the law.

No citizen

will respect the law when the law expects him to do what
he simply cannot do.
The Court should not impose a duty· on the Defendant
to pay what he could not and can not pay.

Such a ruling

would only cause disrespect and distrust of our laws and
legal processes.
Point IV
THE PLAINTIFF OTERO MUST SHARE THE BURDEN
OF SUPPORT FOR THE CHILD.
The State of Utah imposes an equal duty on both
parents to support their children.

A mother has a duty

to support her minor child equal to a father's duty to
support his minor child U.C.A., §78-45-3 and 4, (1953).
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In this case, the co-Plaintiff Otero had a legal
duty to support her daughter.

She shirked this duty by

failin·g to provide support, and the State of Utah provided
that support instead.

It can be argued that co-Plaintiff

Otero was too poor to support her child, and that this fact
should relieve her duty of support and should also relieve
her of any obligation to re-imburse the State for support
monies paid.

Since the Plaintiff State of Utah apparently

has not attempted to obtain a judgment against co-Plaintiff
Otero for past support paid for the child, it can be assumed
that this is the position adopted by Plaintiffs, and tacitly
adopted by the lower Court.
However, the argument applies equally as well
to Defendant.

He could not support the child, so the

State of Utah supported her instead.

Defendant was in just

as dire a financial condition as Plaintiff Otero when the
State performed his support duty.

In fact, since Plaintiff

Otero was free to seek gainful employment while Defendant
was incarcerated during the time in question, Plaintiff
Otero was in a better position to support her daughter than
was the Defendant.

The same theory which renders co-Plaintiff

Otero not liable to re-imburse the State for past support
paid should also relieve the Defendant of the same obligation.
Payment of child support by a non-custodial parent is not
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to be a payment of all amounts needed to support a child.
The custodial parent has an obligation to provide some
financial assistance for the benefit of the child as well
as providing the emotional and nuturing needs of the child.
To say simply by rote that a non-custodial parent
must re-imburse the State for all assistance payments made
denies the mutual obligations of parents to support their
child.

The Complaint asks

that the Defendant alone be

ordered and obligated to re-imburse the State for the monthly
grant of public assistance.

It would be inequitable to

grant Plaintiffs a judgment against Defendant under the
instant facts when both Defendant and Plaintiff Otero had
a duty to support their child, when both of them failed to
perform that duty out of poverty, and when the State of
Utah stepped in to perform that duty instead.
Point V
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT MANDATES
UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE RESULTS IN FUTURE
CASES.
The decision of the Court below mandates extremely
inequitable results.

For example, suppose two seriously

physically handicapped people incapable of ever working were
to marry and have a child.

Suppose the wife were then to

desert the husband, but not seek a divorce, and live seperatel·:
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from the husband and child.

Suppose the State of Utah

then paid public assistance to support the father, the
child, and the mother.

Under the decision of the lower

court, the State of Utah could sue the mother two years
or five years later for all support monies paid for the
child over the period.

According to the Court below,

it would be inappropriate to consider the standard of
living, wealth, or ability to earn of the mother.

All

that could be considered would be the amount of support
arrearages paid by the State.
The decision of the lower Court that a Court
may not consider the financial circumstances of a non-custodial
parent in determining the amount owed for support arrearages
where no prior order for support exists mandates unreasonable
and inequitable results.

For this reason, the judgment of

the Court below should be vacated.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs have obtained a judgment against
Defendant for past support paid by the State of Utah.

This

judgment should be vacated and a judgment entered that
Defendant is underalegal obligation to re-imburse the
Plaintiffs for past support paid only in accordance with
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his current and past ability to pay.

The new judgment should

further provide that since the Defendant had no ability to
pay at the time in question, he has no legal duty to reimburse the State for past support paid.
Defendant should be granted such relief because
of his extreme poverty during the time support was paid
f'

and at the time of judgment.

The Defendant's indigency

should be considered as the controlling factor in determining
the amount of back support owed pursuant to U.C.A.,
§78-45-7 (3), (1953).

The criteria listed in U.C.A.,

§78-45-7 (2), (1953) should be considered since they
would have been controlling had the instant action been
brought at the time Defendant's support obligation first
arose.
Plaintiffs should not be granted a judgment against
Defendant for past support paid, since it would be unreasonable to expect persons to support themselves or
others when they are not capable of doing so, as expressed
in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), and as expressed by the
existence of the public assistance program in Utah.

It is

arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable to require Defendant
to do what he cannot and has not been able to do.
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It is inequitable to grant Plaintiffs a judgment
for all past support paid against Defendant when both Plaintiff
Otero and Defendant were under an equal duty to support their
child and both were unable to perform that duty owing to
their poverty.
The decision of the lower Court mandates unreasonable
results.

Plaintiff's judgment should be vacated, and a

determination made that the Defendant is liable for arrearages
only to the extent of his ability to pay.
Res~ctfully
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MARY C~ CORPOROH

Third Year Law Student for
Defendant-Appellant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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foregoing Brief of Appellant to Diane W. Wilkins, Deputy
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